On March 31, 2026, a permit application for the construction of Poland’s first nuclear power plant (NPP) in Choczewo was submitted to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency. The documentation spans 42,000 pages. On that day, the Polish construction market changed for generations—though the scale of this transformation is not immediately visible.
The value of the power plant itself: PLN 192 billion. That excludes access roads. It excludes the railway line. It excludes water, sewage, power, and logistics infrastructure. All of this will be developed alongside that figure—in separate proceedings, separate contracts, and with separate contracting authorities.
What has happened in the last few weeks—and what is coming in the next ones:
his is not a warm-up. This is the start.
And now, the part that is less comfortably discussed.
Entering the nuclear project supply chain is not a standard public procurement process. It is an entirely different contractual regime.
To begin with, you do not enter the nuclear supply chain with only experience in FIDIC contracts and highway references. Every supplier—from a reinforcement manufacturer to a pipeline installation company—must have a quality management system verified against nuclear standards. In practice, we are talking about the three most important:
Obtaining any of these is a 12–24 month project—not a quarterly one. A company that starts today will be ready for the second or third wave of tenders. Those who start a year from now will only be in time for supplementary orders and secondary supplies.
On top of this, there are EPC contracts with risk mechanisms far exceeding anything the Polish construction market has experienced under FIDIC-based GDDKiA contracts. The regime of the Atomic Law and the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) supervision overlaps with the Public Procurement Law, the Construction Law, and the Special Nuclear Act. Financing linked to State Treasury guarantees, the Contract for Difference (CfD), and the US EXIM loan—each of these elements generates covenants that cascade down the supply chain to subcontractors.
Three questions that a CEO and General Counsel of a construction company should ask themselves within this quarter:
Those who do not have answers today will not participate. Not because they cannot build, but because they failed to prepare contractually.
In this project, legal counsel is not a support function. It is a qualification function.
Ready to go
next level?